University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
College of Education Publications

College of Education

1-27-2000

Education Policy Analysis Archives 08/10
Arizona State University
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/coedu_pub
Part of the Education Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Arizona State University and University of South Florida, "Education Policy Analysis Archives 08/10 " (2000). College of Education
Publications. Paper 268.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/coedu_pub/268

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Education at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in College
of Education Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Education Policy Analysis Archives
Volume 8 Number 10

January 27, 2000

ISSN 1068-2341

A peer-reviewed scholarly electronic journal
Editor: Gene V Glass, College of Education
Arizona State University
Copyright 2000, the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES.
Permission is hereby granted to copy any article
if EPAA is credited and copies are not sold.
Articles appearing in EPAA are abstracted in the Current
Index to Journals in Education by the ERIC Clearinghouse
on Assessment and Evaluation and are permanently archived
in Resources in Education.

Collegiate Grading Practices
and the Gender Pay Gap
Alicia C. Dowd
Cornell University
Abstract
Extending research findings by R. Sabot and J. Wakeman-Linn (1991),
this article presents a theoretical analysis showing that relatively low
grading quantitative fields and high grading verbal fields create a
disincentive for college women to invest in quantitative study. Pressures
on grading practices are modeled using higher education production
functions.
The gender pay gap has narrowed in the United States since the 1970s, but is still
of sufficient magnitude to warrant concern about the equal employment and status of
women. The decrease in the size of the gap can be explained in part by the increasing
numbers of college women who responded to expanded opportunities in the labor
market and chose to enter technical and applied fields, particularly business (Eide, 1994;
Loury, 1997). Women entering fields requiring quantitative skills can expect a greater
return on their educational investments, because such skills are a relatively scarce human
capital input (Paglin & Rufolo, 1990). Numerous studies have demonstrated that, all else
equal, college graduates with quantitative skills will earn more than their counterparts
without such skills (Berger, 1992; Eide, 1994; James & Alsalam, 1993; Rumberger &
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Thomas, 1993; Sharp & Weidman, 1989). However, women continue to be
disproportionately represented in the humanities and social sciences and
underrepresented in mathematics and the applied and physical sciences (National Center
for Education Statistics, 1997). The theoretical analysis presented in this article shows
that one way to increase the participation of college women in quantitative fields, and
potentially reduce the pay gap even further, is to institute uniform collegiate grading
practices in quantitative and nonquantitative fields.
Previous research (Kuh & Hu, 1999; Sabot & Wakeman-Linn, 1991) has provided
evidence that grade inflation and compression has occurred in collegiate disciplines at
different rates, creating non-uniform (or divergent) grading practices. One factor
contributing to the underenrollment of women in quantitative fields may be the use of
relatively high grading practices in nonquantitative, or "verbal," fields and low grading
practices in quantitative fields. This article has two purposes. The first is to show that
grading disparities between academic disciplines have a significant impact on the
curricular and career choices of female students. The second is to apply the analytical
tool of the higher education production function to explain pressures on assessment
practices from within and outside the academy that lead to divergent grading practices.
This analysis also considers from which quarter pressure might come to change such
practices. The discussion takes account of the public and private nature of institutions of
higher education, noting that human capital formation is not their only, or necessarily
even primary, function.

Theoretical Framework
Students earn college credits and degrees by investing time, money, and effort. At
the majority of institutions of higher education, student performance in classes is
evaluated with grades, and students must receive passing grades to receive credit for
coursework. Students must also earn a sufficient number of credits in prescribed areas to
be granted a degree in any given field of study. Variation in the effort students must
expend to successfully complete coursework in different fields creates variation also in
the costs of earning credits in those fields. The full costs of that effort will be tempered
by a student's motivation and interest.
A student might pay the same tuition to major in mathematics or in English, but if
she has strong mathematical skills and weak writing skills, she will have to invest more
time to earn passing grades in English than in mathematics. Thus, the cost of earning a
degree in a given field depends on the effort a student must expend to complete courses
with a passing grade, or, for students with higher standards, to be satisfied with his or
her own performance. In addition, some fields have more numerous or rigorous
requirements, which raises the cost of study in that field relative to other fields for any
student. (Note 1) The grades students receive inform them of their area of comparative
advantage in completing coursework in a subject, the probability of successful
completion of a course of study, and the costs (in time and effort) of obtaining a degree
(Altonji, 1993).
The analysis presented in this article is based on an economic approach (Becker,
1976) to understanding the curricular and career choices of college students. Educational
choices are treated as investment decisions, influenced by pecuniary and non-pecuniary
costs and benefits. By her curricular choices, a student determines the specific type of
human capital she will acquire. She thereby influences potential future returns to the
educational investment and her ability to maximize her "utility," or satisfaction. The
economic approach to understanding human behavior makes a number of assumptions
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about the way in which individuals conceive of their well being. Self-interest is
conceived of broadly, beyond the pursuit of material concerns, to include a wide range
of values and preferences. Individuals are considered to be forward-looking, to have
consistent preferences over time, and to seek to maximize their welfare. There are a
number of constraints on a person's capacity to pursue his or her self-interest and these
include time, income, incomplete information, and lapses in judgment (Becker, 1996).
Altonji (1993) has highlighted the fact that individuals make educational choices
under considerable uncertainty regarding their ability to complete a course of study in
their selected field. His analysis (p. 51) models how "new information about preferences
and academic performance, and new information about payoffs influence choice of
major and the decision to stay in school." Within this human capital framework, as
individuals gain new information, they make their curricular choices, transferring from
one field to another or dropping out of college, based on an estimation of their ability to
complete degree requirements. The probability of completion is influenced by their stock
of knowledge, academic ability, and by degree requirements. The utility function
indicated by Altonji's analysis also includes educational and occupational preferences
and the present value of lifetime earnings.

Prior Research
In a 1991 article published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Sabot and
Wakeman-Linn examined the influence of collegiate grading practices on student course
choice. They documented the existence of grade inflation and compression (low
variation) and also observed grading patterns that characterized high and low grading
departments. They concluded that students face a disincentive to study in low grading
fields, which, in their study of a small but varied sample of U.S. colleges, were
predominantly quantitative fields. They found that economics, chemistry, and
mathematics are consistently low grading fields, while art, English, music, philosophy,
psychology, and political science are consistently high grading fields. In a survey
administered to a small sample of English majors at a research university (Dowd, 1998),
I also found that responding students believed that the average grades in biological
sciences, physics, computer science, and chemistry at their institution was a B-; in
political science, philosophy, economics, and mathematics a B; and in foreign
languages, English, sociology, and history a B+. Consistent with Sabot and
Wakemann-Linn's study, the low grading fields included quantitative subjects and the
high grading fields included verbal subjects.
Davis (1966) argued that college students assess their areas of comparative
advantage (where their skills and aptitudes put them ahead of their peers) based on the
local competition for grades at their institution. Students then shape their career plans
based on the feedback grades provide. However, Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991)
observed that due to varying rates of grade inflation and compression among academic
departments, "grades as a signal of relative strengths and weaknesses {are} more
difficult for students to interpret." They noted (p. 167) that students do not adequately
adjust their perception of differentially-scaled grades in order to gain a sense of their
relative strengths and weaknesses, because "the incentive effects of absolute grades on
course choice are far more powerful" than the indicators of comparative advantage that
are weakened by non-uniform grading. Sabot and Wakeman-Linn argued that arbitrary
differences in grading policies should be eliminated, because they provide incentives for
some students to move away from academic areas where they are comparatively strong.
Conversely, the effect of more-uniform grading policies would be to encourage greater
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numbers of students to take courses in the currently low grading departments, which are
those that place emphasis on quantitative skills. While the labor market, through high
earnings, provides an incentive to invest in quantitative study, under divergent
grading—where quantitative fields are low grading relative to others—colleges create a
disincentive to investment in quantitative study.

Divergent Grading and Labor Market Supply
The following simple utility-maximizing model extends Sabot and
Wakeman-Linn's (1991) analysis to highlight the influence of non-uniform grading
practices, where they exist, on the supply of college graduates with quantitative skills.
The model is intended to facilitate a policy analysis of the implications of divergent
grading for gender equity in earnings.
Under divergent grading practices, when a student decides in which fields of study
to invest her time, she faces greater costs to obtain the valuables associated with college
study in a quantitative rather than a verbal field. To obtain a certain number of credits in
a quantitative rather than a humanities class with a grade of B would on average require
more effort, because quantitative classes have lower mean grades. The relative costs of
the effort to earn a degree through study in quantitatively or verbally oriented fields may
be represented by the ratio EQ/EV , where EQ represents the costs, psychic and otherwise,
associated with quantitative study, and EV represents the costs associated with verbal
study. I assume that this ratio is fixed for each individual (disregarding the fact that costs
would vary as students make marginal investments in either field).
We can also represent the ratio of the different compensation packages offered by
employers to individuals with strong quantitative and strong verbal skills as WQ/WV .
Again, I assume that this ratio is fixed. A forward-looking student with complete
information about her future wage potential could determine whether to invest in
quantitative or verbal study by comparing WQ/W V and EQ/EV . If WQ/WV > EQ/E V, she
would choose to invest in quantitative study. If WQ/WV < EQ/EV , she would choose to
invest in verbal study, and if the two ratios are equal, she would be indifferent to these
two options. For example, if the wage ratio is 2:1 (Q:V), then the student should invest
her time pursuing quantitative study as long as earning credits in quantitative fields is
less than twice as difficult (accounting for all costs, both psychic and material) as
earning credits in verbal fields. The forward-looking student in this scenario would need
to take into account lifelong earnings and career satisfaction, as well as the continuing
education required to succeed at the occupations pursued.
The college's assessment systems and grading policies affect a student's decision
to choose to study in a quantitative or verbal field by the fact that the differential
between average grades in these two types of fields is one component (along with
ability, motivation, and interest) establishing the ratio EQ/E V. As the differential
increases, the value of EQ /EV also increases, and a greater number of students will
determine it is not a wise investment to study in a quantitative field. In this way, the
divergent grading system is a contributing factor determining the proportion of the
population of college graduates who enter the labor market with quantitative skills.
Student perceptions of the relative wages offered for quantitative and verbal skills also
influence the proportion of students who enter different fields of study (as Freeman
(1978) has illustrated with his cobweb model of curricular and career choice).
College graduates with different types of interests and abilities encounter different
opportunities in the labor market. As strong quantitative skills are scarce relative to
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strong verbal skills, quantitative skills are compensated at a higher rate in the labor
market than are verbal skills. Recent studies indicate earnings advantages over
comparison groups of humanities and education majors of 23% to 61% for engineers, up
to 25% for business majors, 13% to 35% for students of mathematics and the physical
sciences, and 8% to 24% for social scientists (Angle & Wissmann, 1981; Berger, 1992;
Bishop, 1994; Daymont & Andrisani, 1984; Eide, 1994; Griffin & Alexander, 1978;
James & Alsalam, 1993; Rumberger & Thomas, 1993; Sharp & Weidman, 1989). When
students are influenced by divergent grading practices to invest in verbal skills rather
than in quantitative skills, the supply of verbal skills provided by college graduates to
the labor market increases over the supply of graduates who would have made this
choice, given their aptitudes and interests, under uniform grading practices. Labor
economic theory indicates that the impact of this supply shift would lead to a decrease in
wages paid to graduates offering verbal skills to employers (Ehrenberg & Smith, 1993).

Influences on the Curricular Choices of Women
Divergent grading leads to a greater quantitative- skills deficit among women than
among men for several reasons. The first relates to the distribution of quantitative skills
among men and women. In the population of college-bound high school graduates,
women are less likely to be among those with the strongest quantitative skills. In
addition, the measured quantitative and verbal skills of men show greater variance than
that of women (Cole, 1997), and those students at the tails of the quantitative and verbal
skills distribution are least affected by divergent grading. Students who have average
skills in both quantitative and verbal fields are those who are most likely to receive
misinformation about their comparative skills advantage as a result of low grading in
quantitative fields and high grading in verbal fields. On the basis of their abilities, these
students should be indifferent regarding choice of field. However, the degree of
misinformation they receive is the full difference between average quantitative and
verbal grades, and they are then motivated to choose verbal fields. Students with close to
average quantitative and verbal skills are also likely to receive erroneous feedback.
Students with a quantitative/verbal skills differential so large that the grading differential
does not change the direction of the signal regarding their area of comparative advantage
are not affected.
Second, women may be more affected by the quantitative/verbal grading
differential because they may already face higher costs of study in quantitative than in
verbal fields as a consequence of participating in a learning environment that is oriented
toward men. Sandler, Silverberg, and Hall (1996) have described a "chilly classroom
climate" for women, which is exacerbated in traditionally male fields. In such a climate,
women would experience psychic costs as they find their intellects and class
contributions devalued. In particular, the competitiveness of study in quantitative fields
relative to verbal fields may create high costs for women who pursue quantitative study
(Dowd, 1998; Strenta, Elliott, Adair, Matier, & Scott, 1994). Even when women have
equal measured abilities and aptitudes as men in quantitative fields, they have been
found to enjoy science courses less than their male counterparts and to choose at greater
rates to exit the field (Ware, Steckler, & Leserman, 1985). Prior research has shown that
women persist in quantitative fields at greater rates if they attend women's colleges
(Jacobs, 1996; Solnick, 1995), which suggests that women find a more welcoming
environment in all-female classes, experiencing lower costs than those imposed by a
male- centered environment. However, the findings on the effect of women's colleges on
female educational attainments are not conclusive (Riordan, 1994; Smith, Wolf, &
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Morrison, 1995).
Finally, women may also give greater weight in making their curricular choices to
their present or "local" status, to use Frank's term (1985), in the collegiate environment
than to their future economic status. Loury (1997) found that women are less motivated
than men by the college wage premium in making the decision to attend college. Frank
(1996) and Daymont and Andrisani (1984) found that women place greater value than
men on moral and personal dimensions of career satisfaction. These findings suggest
that women are less concerned than men with future monetary returns to education. This
disinterest may cause women to spend less time acquiring information about salaries and
to underestimate the relative economic returns to quantitative and verbal fields of study.
Disinterest may also be fostered by greater uncertainty concerning labor market
participation, due to the fact that child-rearing responsibilities often interrupt women's
careers. As Polachek (1981) observed, the prospect of discontinuous employment may
provide an incentive for women to acquire human capital that does not depreciate
quickly during their time outside the labor force and lead them to avoid rapidly changing
technological fields. However, England (1982) countered that available data do not
support this hypothesis.

The Higher Education Production Function
The discussion above has shown that divergent grading creates a disincentive to
study in quantitative fields. Further, it demonstrates that these disincentives are likely to
have a greater influence on the curricular choices of women than of men. At this point,
beginning with an overview of relevant aspects of several theories of the higher
education production function, I evaluate the factors creating patterns of low and high
grading in quantitative and verbal fields of study. The need for and purposes of grading
can be understood as part of a higher education production function, and the existence of
divergent grading practices suggests that quantitative and verbal fields experience a
different kind or degree of pressure to produce grades.
Production functions consider the outcomes of schooling as educational "outputs"
resulting from various inputs including faculty, quality of students, and physical and
financial capital. The demand for these outputs, which include teaching, research, and
public service, comes from students, private and public funding agencies, and donors
(Garvin, 1980; Hopkins, 1990; Hopkins & Massy, 1981; James, 1990). Production
functions typically are based on the assumption that the goal of a private firm is to
maximize profits. It is further assumed that market forces create an imperative that firms
produce at the most efficient technological boundary of production. These assumptions
do not apply to higher education, however, and in modifying the production function
model for the higher education context, researchers have proposed several other
objectives, including the maximization of administrative scope, income, and prestige.
The role played by grading in the production function varies depending on the outcome
to be maximized.
Niskanen (1971) described universities as "mixed bureaus," non-profit
organizations with public and private characteristics, due to the fact that they are funded
through grants as well as through revenues generated by selling their output at a per-unit
rate. He viewed universities as income-maximizers, whose administrators and faculty
gain utility by increasing the size and scope of their bureaucracy. Breneman (1976)
observed that faculty members seek to optimize departmental prestige, and Garvin
(1980) elaborated on this and other research to develop a model of institutions as a
whole as prestige maximizers. Faculty members gain utility from increasing levels of
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prestige associated with their departments in the form of higher salaries, better quality
graduate students who can be attracted at a lower price, higher caliber colleagues, and
greater success rates in seeking internal or external funding.
Zemsky and his colleagues drew on elements of the prestige- and
bureaucracy-maximizing utility models to argue that faculty members increasingly
expend their energies toward individual goals, away from the goals of the institution
(Pew Higher Education Research Program, 1990; Zemsky, Massy, & Oedel, 1993). They
attribute this phenomena to misplaced incentive structures that motivate faculty to focus
on their research at the expense of teaching and advising. Faculty members maximize
prestige in their disciplinary labor market by publishing academic papers. Teaching, the
quality and value of which is difficult to present to external observers, carries little
reward, they argued.

The Demand for Grades
The prestige- and bureaucracy-maximizing production models of higher education
provide a theoretical basis for examining the characteristics of high and low grading
departments. In this section, I extend these models to explain the pressures on
departments at four-year research institutions to adopt high or low grading practices. I
also use a utility maximization analysis to describe the interests students have in the
prestige of their institutions and the demand they create for grades.
As Breneman (1976) and Garvin (1980) have illustrated theoretically and
empirically, departments at research universities maximize prestige through research and
scholarly output. They can increase their output by hiring very productive faculty
members or by increasing the total number among the faculty. As increasing student
enrollments provide a rationale for additional faculty hiring, there is a derived demand
for a larger quantity of students. As faculty members prefer to work with talented
students, there is also a demand for higher quality students. When departments attract
external research funds from the government, foundations, or corporations, they can
afford to lose a share of university resources allocated on the basis of student enrollment.
The availability of external funding creates pressure to "weed out" less talented students
and reduce enrollments. Departments that attract a lesser share of external research
dollars will attempt to maximize enrollment, a goal that would relax pressures for
competitive grading practices intended to dissuade the least capable students to leave the
field.
Under certain conditions, students themselves create a demand for competitive
grading, in a way that the other agents in the higher education output-demand system do
not. Funding agencies, such as the government and foundations, are primarily interested
in the outputs of research and teaching, as they make investments in higher education to
develop public goods and promote social welfare. For students, higher education is both
a consumption and an investment good (Schultz, 1961). The immediate value of their
consumption is affected by the quality of teaching and learning, including modes of
assessment. The value of their investment benefit is influenced by the status of their
college (Heath, 1993).
Heath (1993) has illustrated theoretically that students value both local and global
status, where local status is defined as a student's academic standing at her institution.
As was discussed above, local status informs a student's understanding of the investment
costs of completing a degree in any given field of study (Altonji, 1993). Local status also
has psychic costs and benefits (Frank, 1985) and contributes to determining the
consumption value of a student's education. In Heath's analysis, global status is
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determined largely by a college's ability to place graduates in high paying occupations
and in graduate and professional programs. Global status is influenced by an institution's
academic rigor and the quality of enrolled students, with greater rigor attracting an
academically talented student body. Students value the positive effects of higher
standards on their global status, but fear the potentially negative effects on their local
status and the increased costs of completing their work.
Student interest and influence on collegiate grading practices stem from their
investment and consumption decisions. Students can be expected to endorse competitive
grading practices, in which performance is graded on a curve and where average grades
are low relative to other fields, if they perceive that such practices enhance their global
status and ability to compete for high paying jobs. Students who are competing for
scarce places in lucrative professions will have the greatest concern for global status.
Under heavy interest, access to an occupation becomes limited and institutions have a
prestige-maximizing incentive to certify only a portion of their students for entry into
that field. The response to this incentive is the adoption of assessment practices that are
designed to motivate or require those who are least capable to leave the field of study
(Breneman, 1976).
Students who are not career oriented and who place a greater value on higher
education as a consumption good can be expected to resist competitive grading and to
avoid such practices when making their course choices, because it imposes immediate
psychic costs and reduces the consumption value of their classes. If a field of study does
not provide a closely articulated link to lucrative and competitive career paths, students
will demonstrate a lack of interest in the credentialing function of grades. These students
may value grades intrinsically as a reflection of their talents, but they do not create a
demand for comparative rankings. In the absence of preprofessional student pressures,
the field has an income- and resource- maximizing incentive to become high grading in
order to attract enrollment.
In summary, the prestige-maximizing and bureaucracy-maximizing model of
higher education production provides a theoretical basis for understanding the pressures
on collegiate grading practices. External research dollars enable departments to
maximize prestige and income while "weeding out" the least successful students from
their programs. Student careerism also creates pressures for competitive grading, as
students wish to enhance their global status. The model clearly predicts the behavior of
departments experiencing a combination of low student careerism and low external
funding (high grading practices) and high careerism and high external funding (low
grading practices). As quantitative and applied fields are influenced much more greatly
by research interests and strong links to employers than are arts and letters fields
(Becher, 1989; Breneman, 1976), they are more likely to adopt low grading practices to
maximize prestige. Verbal fields, with weak ties to employers and low levels of research
funding, are more likely to adopt high grading practices to maximize administrative
scope and enrollment.

Traditions of Scholarship
The educational production function identifies the utility-maximizing goals of
scholars in different disciplines and provides a model that predicts grading practices in
response to different output-demand systems. Internal features of departments stemming
from disciplinary traditions and epistemologies may also account for different
assessment practices. In Academic Tribes and Territories, Becher (1989) characterizes
modes of scholarship in academic disciplines. His four-part taxonomy of "hard pure,"
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"hard applied," "soft applied," and "soft pure" fields bears resemblance to the simpler
quantitative/verbal dichotomy I have used. Hard fields are quantitative and soft fields,
which include the humanities, social sciences, and "social professions" (education, social
work, law), may or may not employ quantitative analyses. The applied fields, whether
hard or soft, are those whose research practices are influenced strongly by practitioners
and a search for practical knowledge. Becher's applied fields are those I have described
as having ties with employers. Whether these employment relationships influence
grading practices depends on the level of competition among students for entry into
related occupations and professions. These relationships can be influential in a hard
applied field, such as engineering, as well as in a soft applied field, such as business.
As Becher (1989) indicates, the modes of scholarship in the applied fields follow
from those of their pure counterparts, but are altered by the focus of applied fields on
generating solutions to practical issues outside academe. For this reason, the
epistemological distinctions that Becher observes between hard pure fields (natural
sciences and mathematics) and soft pure fields (humanities and social sciences) describe
the predominant disciplinary traditions and cultures that may influence grading practices.
He offers a set of contrasts that, in sum, indicate that hard pure fields have a more
clearly defined body of knowledge than the soft pure fields. First, Becher (1989, p. 13)
observes, knowledge in hard pure fields is cumulative through the work of generations
of researchers building on each others' findings relevant to clearly defined and bounded
questions. In contrast, soft pure fields address issues that retain their currency over time.
Researchers in soft pure fields make contributions, not by generating new knowledge,
but by providing insights into familiar topics. Soft pure fields lack the clear boundaries
that specify areas of investigation in hard pure fields. Second, while hard pure fields
"break down complex ideas into smaller components," in soft pure fields "complexity is
regarded as a legitimate aspect of knowledge, to be recognized and appreciated" (p. 14).
Third, in hard pure fields, scientists make "strong" arguments based on mathematical
models, measurement, and observed regularities. In soft pure fields, where explanation
revolves around numerous concepts and the absence of clearly defined variables,
scholars make apparently weak arguments and rely more heavily on "judgment and
persuasion" (p. 14). Finally, soft pure knowledge recognizes and admits the
"intentionality" of the scholar, while hard pure fields convey knowledge as "impersonal"
and "value-free" (pp. 14-15).
Becher, himself, does not comment on differences in assessment practices
between fields. This likely stems from the fact that participants in his case study at "elite
departments" defined their membership in their academic professions "in terms of
excellence in scholarship and originality in research, and not to any significant degree in
terms of teaching capability" (p. 3). For this same reason, grading practices may be given
peripheral attention, be little affected by disciplinary norms, and be easily modified by
external influences. Or, they may follow closely from the research traditions. In the latter
case, the openness of soft pure fields to divergent viewpoints combined with the
acceptance of unresolved complexities in subject content would be consistent with
assessment practices that allow numerous "correct" answers. In contrast, hard pure fields
would be expected to rely on assessment practices that test students' abilities to convey
their understanding of established subject content and to make greater distinctions
between right and wrong answers. Low grading practices in hard pure (quantitative)
fields and high grading practices in soft pure (verbal) fields may, therefore, have
epistemological roots. This explanation is not completely persuasive, however, because
the soft pure fields awarded lower grades on average in earlier times (Kuh & Hu, 1999;
Sabot & Wakeman-Linn, 1991). Understanding of the relative influence of external
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demands and internal traditions of scholarship on assessment practices would require a
study of changes in external and internal departmental environments in relation to
changes in grading over time. To my knowledge, such a study has not yet been
conducted.

Empirical Tests
Though little research has been conducted that tests the predictions of the
production function model of grading practices, two recent studies present relevant
findings. Freeman (1999) investigated the predicted relationship that departments with
graduates entering lucrative professions have low average grades. He hypothesized (p.
344) that "given equal money prices per credit hour across disciplines, departments
manage their enrollments by ‘pricing' their courses with grading standards
commensurate with the market benefits of their courses, as measured by expected
incomes." Using data from the National Center for Education Statistics on 648 U.S.
institutions of higher education, he confirmed that fields associated with higher starting
salaries had lower GPAs than those associated with greater "income risk" (p. 350). His
research provides evidence that departments manage student enrollment through their
grading practices. Those experiencing higher student demand due to positive salary
prospects for graduates are more likely to grade more rigorously. Freeman's work did not
also estimate the influence of available research dollars on grading practices.
Kuh and Hu (1999) investigated the causes of grade inflation from the mid-1980s
to the mid-1990s, providing evidence that average grades have increased during that
time period. However, their models do not include variables representing changes in
labor market returns to field of study or changes in availability of externally funded
research dollars, so the work does not provide a test of the production function model of
grading practices. Their results do provide some relevant empirical evidence to evaluate
the model, however. Using a large national data base including students from
approximately 600 four-year colleges and universities, they find (p. 306) that grades in
the humanities increased at a faster rate than grades in science and mathematics, with the
grade increase in the science and mathematics cluster observed to be minimal. This
finding supports the idea that quantitative fields, which have greater opportunities to
attract research support, are resistant to inflationary pressures on grading. Grades in the
social sciences and preprofessional fields were on average lower than those in science
and mathematics, which, if the included social sciences were applied fields, supports the
aspect of the model that indicates that preprofessional students will create a demand for
rigorous grading.
In addition, Kuh and Hu found (p. 304) that while "grades increased across the
board the increases were greatest at [research universities]," which suggests that some
fields at research universities felt the greatest pressure to increase grades. Under the
production function model, these fields are expected to be those attracting few external
research dollars, though they could only have had the observed impact on the average
grades if they were, indeed, departments with high enrollments. However,
disaggregating the broader results, Kuh and Hu find (p. 314) that grades in general
liberal arts colleges and in the humanities and social sciences were actually deflated in
private institutions during the period under study. These findings may provide evidence
contradictory to the production function model. Alternatively, they may indicate that
humanities and social science fields without a significant preprofessional student body
do not assume inflationary practices unless they are in a competitive situation with low
grading preprofessional and research- oriented fields, which are more likely to be found
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at public and research universities. The latter interpretation of their results is appropriate
if the sample included a significant number of private liberal arts colleges among the
private institutions, but it is not possible to draw this conclusion from the article.

Discussion
The existence of divergent grading indicates that high grading and low grading
departments are subject to different output-demand systems for grades. Institutions
themselves are not likely to insist on uniform grading practices across their departments
without a change in that demand system. If we assume that departments are maximizing
their utility under existing practices, from what quarter might change toward uniform
grading come? As discussed above, students, with their sometimes conflicting interests
in global and local status, and agencies such as corporations, foundations, and the state,
with their interests in the outputs of research and teaching, are the primary consumers of
higher education. In this section, I discuss the potential motivations of the state and of
students to create a demand for change. Foundations with an interest in social justice and
economic development may play a role analogous to that of the state discussed below.
Corporate sponsors of research will be most interested in private returns to their
investments, but corporations too have an interest in an adequate supply of college
graduates who have quantitative training.
As a matter of social justice, the state has an interest in promoting equal
employment opportunities for women. As a matter of economic development, it has an
interest in encouraging women to develop human capital in quantitative fields if market
mechanisms are not providing an adequate incentive. Through research grants and
internship programs, in its role as an employer, and through direct funding of colleges
and universities, the state creates a demand for research and teaching. Through
specialized programs, it structures some of that demand to create opportunities for
women. These opportunities do not attract as many women in the presence of divergent
grading as they would under uniform grading (as some women continue to choose verbal
fields despite the offer of an incentive, due to the higher cost of earning a degree in a
quantitative field). The state could potentially increase the enrollment of women in
quantitative fields by putting regulative pressure on colleges to adopt uniform grading
practices.
However, as Strike (1997) has argued, when state regulatory processes require
educational institutions to promote human capital formation as the goal of schooling, the
resulting regulations promote a particular conception of what constitutes a good life.
Such an intrusion as defining human capital formation as the goal of education, at the
exclusion or expense of other legitimate schooling goals, is beyond the purview of the
state. Colleges and universities do not have an obligation to motivate female students to
plan their educational investments with an eye toward future economic success. The
traditional liberal arts curriculum has been intended to produce people who are
"virtuous, of good taste and liberated interests" (Strike), not people whose educational
and life goal is to attain high earnings. Liberal arts colleges may very legitimately wish
to structure the curriculum, including grading practices, to require or encourage students
to take liberal arts courses. If liberal arts colleges choose to promote enrollment in
liberal arts courses by intentionally lowering the psychic costs of study in those courses,
that approach may well be consistent with institutional goals. Pressures for uniform
grading might therefore come from the state, not in a regulatory mode but in its capacity
as a consumer. The state addresses its human capital concerns by supporting educational
programs that provide training in areas it deems valuable, thereby increasing the

11 of 19

attractiveness of those areas to prospective students (by reducing associated tuition costs
or by providing enhanced instructional facilities, for example). To further increase
enrollment of women in quantitative fields, the state could attempt to alter aspects of the
learning environment in those fields that create greater costs for women than for men.
As competitive learning environments appear to place a particularly onerous burden on
women (Dowd, 1998; Sandler et al., 1996; Strenta et al., 1994), the creation of
non-competitive workshops, internships, research projects, or other opportunities of this
type may serve to attract women to the study of mathematics and science. Non-graded
instructional programs in quantitative fields could rely on other types of assessment to
provide students with an incentive to learn the material presented. Such programs would
provide certification of the attainment of threshold levels of knowledge, but would not
provide comparative rankings. The instructional program would be structured to allow
students multiple opportunities, as needed, to acquire the skills and knowledge necessary
to capitalize on their investment in the labor market. Such an approach may be less
efficient than using competitive grading to identify the most able students, but may be
more efficient in fostering occupational gender equity. Astin (1990) has advocated a
"talent development approach" to assessment in higher education, arguing for
noncompetitive assessments on the basis of both equity and efficiency.
Demand for competitive grading in verbal fields might be created by trends in
student enrollment. As the human capital model indicates, both grades and the present
value of lifetime earnings are part of the equation determining the best human capital
investment for a particular student. If the earnings associated with verbal fields of study
fell so low as to outweigh the benefits of high grading, enrollment in verbal fields would
fall. In that case, colleges might seek to create better links with employers for liberal arts
graduates in order to place graduates in higher paying positions and to bolster
enrollments. One way to establish these links would be to take an active role in
supplying the most talented students to those labor markets. Such an approach would
lead to comparative grading practices that would bear more resemblance to grading
practices in quantitative fields.
Alumni donors might support such developments, because the increased success
of graduates in the labor market would enhance institutional prestige. As Heath (1993)
observed, alumni benefit most from increases in an institution's prestige, experiencing
positive benefits related to their alma mater's enhanced reputation, without having to pay
the costs associated with the academic competition of a higher quality student body.
Alternatively, alumni might decry the professionalism of liberal arts programs and
oppose new practices. The effect of their influence would depend on whether alumni
donations are of a sufficient amount to motivate income-maximizing behaviors.
Liberal arts colleges and departments do not have an ethical obligation to ensure
access to employment information for their students, but they may benefit themselves by
enabling their students to more efficiently estimate their future utility and to make
investments in course choices that will maximize their financial return. If the college's
graduates are able to maximize their utility in the labor market at a higher level after
having had access to employment information while in college, the graduates would be
able to achieve higher levels of both income and career satisfaction. Such an outcome
would increase alumni donations, as well as the demand from prospective students for a
liberal arts education.

Conclusion
I have presented a theoretical model, based on various explications of a higher

12 of 19

education production function, to explain the demand for college grades. I have
described student assessment as part of the process of producing educational outputs.
The practice of high grading in verbal fields and low grading in quantitative fields was
placed in the context of the different levels of demand placed on those fields for the
outputs of teaching and research. Low grading fields are predicted to experience high
demand by preprofessional students for entry into occupations with scarce positions
and/or a high demand for research. The opposite demand system would affect high
grading departments. Students who are concerned with entering a lucrative and
competitive profession will create a demand for rigorous grading as it contributes to the
prestige of the institution and to their own "global status," or value in the labor market.
Students who are less career-oriented will place greater value on the consumption
benefit of a college education and be concerned with the quality of teaching and learning
and the value of their own "local status," or academic standing. Evidence from prior
research was presented to show that women are more influenced than men in their
choice of major by local status concerns, leading them to disproportionately choose high
grading verbal fields. Thus, divergent grading creates an incentive for women to underinvest in quantitative fields of study, and, thereby, contributes to occupational sex
segregation and the gender pay gap.

Notes
1. See Hoenack and Weiler (1975) for a discussion of the potential impact on
university administration of charging different tuition rates by field of study.
2. While this simple model refers to an either/or investment in two different kinds of
study, the argument could be extended to evaluate marginal investments in
quantitative and verbal subjects and to take account of the different returns to
various subfields.
3. This article is based on the author's dissertation research.
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